The Future CollectiveWhat Next?  The decade to 2035
Contents
  1. What it covers
  2. In five minutes
  3. The argument
  4. Twelve domains
  5. 01Work
  6. 02Machines
  7. 03Money
  8. 04Health
  9. 05Energy and climate
  10. 06Buying
  11. 07Making and moving
  12. 08Places
  13. 09Food
  14. 10Learning
  15. 11Truth
  16. 12Power
  17. Worlds in 2035
  18. The calls
  19. How we tested our tools
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The Future Collective · Flagship report · October 2026

What Next?

When intelligence gets cheap, what gets expensive?

What happens to work, money, health, energy, food, learning, truth and power over the decade to 2035. Twelve questions, four possible worlds, and twelve dated calls we will mark in public every October.

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What it covers

Twelve domains, one decade.

One chapter for each part of life, from work and money to food, truth and power. Each asks one question about 2035, answers it, and makes a call we will mark in public every October.

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In five minutes

The report in five minutes

2035 is as far ahead of us as 2017 is behind. Much of it is already settled: the people who will be working, retiring and starting school then are alive now, and many of the laws and building projects that will shape it already have dates. This report starts from what is settled, says what is likely and how sure we are, and then makes twelve calls we will mark in public every October.

01

The argument

Machine intelligence is getting cheaper at a remarkable rate. When one thing becomes abundant, value moves to whatever is still scarce beside it. Across the twelve chapters the same four things keep running short.

  • Proof. When anything can be generated, knowing what is real becomes valuable. Trust in news is at 37%, the lowest the Reuters Institute has recorded.
  • People. From this year the UK is projected to record more deaths than births. Carers, builders, physics teachers and grid engineers are short now and will be shorter.
  • Physical capacity. Software can be copied; substations cannot. Grids, water, homes and planning permission will set the pace of the 2030s far more than code.
  • Coherence. Most failures in this report are failures to join things up: tools nobody has absorbed, targets with no delivery plan.

The caveat runs through every chapter: cheap is not the same as useful. The gap between what the machines can do and what organisations actually do with them is wide.

02

Twelve questions, twelve answers

  1. Will AI take our jobs? No. Not enough to break the jobs market. The bigger problem is too few workers and a broken first rung.
  2. Will AI eat the power grid? Yes. Data centres head for more than 1,000 TWh a year.
  3. Will we need a universal basic income? No. We will pay for a bigger benefits bill instead.
  4. What happens to the NHS? It survives, but misses its own promise, and not by a little.
  5. Will renewables win? Only just: about half the world's electricity by 2035.
  6. Will we stop buying so much stuff? We already have, per head.
  7. Will Britain make more of what it buys? No. The goods deficit stays wide.
  8. Will we build the homes we need? No.
  9. Will British farming survive? Yes. Fewer farms, same share of food.
  10. Is university still worth it? For most, yes. Not for all.
  11. Will we get our news from AI? Yes, nearly a third of us.
  12. Is Britain shrinking? Yes, without migration.

Read together, most answers say that something people fear or hope for does not arrive on time. A few say a slow trend keeps going. Only three say something moves fast: the machines' appetite for electricity, the share of it from renewables, and the number of people who get their news from a machine. That is the argument in twelve lines. Intelligence is getting cheap fast. Almost everything it needs in order to matter is scarce and slow.

03

Four worlds

Two things decide which 2035 we get: whether people and institutions learn to use cheap intelligence widely, and whether the physical and public things get built and paid for. That gives four worlds, which we follow through one invented person, Sam, aged 27 in Stockport. In The Long Grind, nothing collapses and everything takes slightly longer than it should. In The Crossing, institutions redesign how they think and the gains reach people like Sam. In The Split, the remarkable things all happen, to someone else. In The Shock, something large from outside stops the money and materials everything else assumed. Our view is that Britain is in The Long Grind today, drifting towards The Split. The Crossing is available, and it is mostly a matter of design and delivery.

04

How we will be marked

Every call names the official figure that will settle it. Our confidence levels imply we should get about eight of the twelve right: all twelve would mean we were too timid, five that we were overconfident. Before publishing we put the calls to a panel of 24 synthetic forecasters. It thought two of our calls too easy, so we made them harder: unemployment below 5.5% rather than 6%, and fewer than 75% of NHS patients seen within 18 weeks rather than 92%. Where it thought us too sure, on farming and university, we have held and said so. The scorecard comes every October.

05

If you read nothing else

  • Treat late 2026 to mid-2028 as one project. Carbon borders, battery passports, one-day settlement, identity wallets and AI rules all land in that stretch.
  • Keep hiring juniors. Judgement has to be grown, and an organisation that stops hiring 23-year-olds now will find in 2034 that it has no 31-year-olds who know how anything works.
  • Measure AI gains with your own controlled comparisons. Feelings of speed are not data.

Twelve questions about 2035, and our answers

Our confidence, and where a synthetic forecasting panel put the same call

Our confidenceSynthetic panel medianSettled by official figures; scorecard every October* Panel judged an earlier, easier version of the call
A silicon wafer of microchips catching the light

Part one · The argument

When intelligence gets cheap, what gets expensive?

Proof, people, physical capacity and coherence.

Photograph: Unsplash

Read the chapter

Part one

The argument

01

Nine years is not long

2035 is exactly as far ahead of us as 2017 is behind. Nine years. Most of us can remember 2017 without effort, which is a useful corrective to the idea that the mid-2030s is science fiction.

A surprising amount of 2035 already exists. The eighteen-year-olds of that year are in primary school now. Everyone who will draw a state pension in 2035 has been alive for more than half a century. The children who will start school in England and Wales in 2029 and 2030 were born last year, and there were fewer of them than in any year since 1977 (ONS). The grid connections, reservoirs and railway lines that will be finished by then have, for the most part, already been applied for. Several have already been delayed.

So this is not a book of guesses. It starts with what is already settled: the laws with dates on them, the people already born, the contracts already signed. Then it moves to what is likely, and says how sure we are. Then it stops at the questions nobody can answer yet, and shows the two ways each could go.

We have done this for twelve parts of life, from work and money to food and power. And we finish by doing something forecasters generally avoid. We make twelve specific calls about 2035, write down what would prove each one wrong, and promise to mark our own homework in public every year.

A report about everything is an absurd thing to attempt. We know. But most people do not live in a sector. They live in a house, with a job, a body, a bank account and a view about the news. The future arrives in all of those at once, and it seemed worth trying to describe it the same way.

Full edition

The rest of this part is in the full edition.

All twelve chapters, the four worlds and every source, as a 167-page download you keep. £550 + VAT.

Rows of terraced streets at golden hour, from above

Part two · Twelve domains

What happens to everyday life?

Twelve chapters, one for each part of a life.

Photograph: Unsplash

Read the chapter

Part two

Part two: Twelve domains

Twelve chapters follow, one for each part of a life. Each stands alone and takes about ten minutes.

ChapterThe open question
01WorkIs the bottom rung of the career ladder gone for good?
02MachinesDoes capability turn into transformation, or does adoption lag by a decade?
03MoneyDo ageing states fix their finances by choice, or have it forced on them?
04HealthDoes new medicine bend the illness curve, or widen the gap?
05Energy and climateDoes clean power cut fossil fuel use, or only meet new demand?
06BuyingDoes the AI agent become the buyer, or stay the adviser?
07Making and movingDoes the West hold its electric car deadlines, and whose factories supply the cars?
08PlacesDoes Britain build the homes, or legislate the ambition?
09FoodDoes food stay cheap?
10LearningDoes AI raise what people can do unaided, or only what they can produce with it?
11TruthCan verified reporting survive when a machine stands between reader and source?
12PowerManaged rivalry between armed blocs, or something worse?
Commuters crossing a station concourse, seen from above

01 · Work

Will AI take our jobs?

No. Not enough to break the jobs market.

Our confidence 60%Panel, on the earlier, easier line 78%

Photograph: Unsplash

Read the chapter

01 · Work

Work

The robots are not coming for your job. The awkward truth is closer to the opposite: over the next decade there will not be enough workers, and the people struggling most will be the ones trying to get their first job.

01/12

01 · Work

20 of 26

years in which UK unemployment has stayed below 6%.

Source: ONS · Landscape drawn from the chapter’s data

01

Already locked in

Fewer workers per pensioner. From mid-2026 the UK is projected to record more deaths than births, so every bit of population growth comes from migration. By 2034 the number of people of pension age rises by 1.8 million to 14.2 million, while the working-age population grows by only 1.5 million (ONS). Across the rich world the working-age population shrinks about 8% by 2060, and in South Korea by up to 46% (OECD).

A longer working life. The UK state pension age reaches 67 by 2028. A review due by March 2029 will decide whether 68 comes sooner than the 2044 to 2046 now in law. China began raising its retirement ages in January 2025 (NPC Observer).

New rights at work. The Employment Rights Act 2025 is arriving in stages. Day-one sick pay began in April 2026. From January 2027, protection against unfair dismissal starts after six months, not two years, with guaranteed-hours offers for zero-hours workers to follow (Lewis Silkin tracker).

02

Likely

Slow growth and a reshuffle, not a collapse. The US Bureau of Labor Statistics expects employment to grow 3.5% between 2025 and 2035, against 10.9% in the decade before. Healthcare supplies more than a third of the new jobs. Office and administrative support shrinks by about 750,000 (BLS).

Skills that expire faster. Employers surveyed by the World Economic Forum expect 39% of workers' current skills to change or go out of date by 2030. Of every 100 workers, 59 will need training, and 11 are unlikely to get it.

Exposure almost everywhere. One in four workers worldwide is in an occupation with some exposure to generative AI, though the ILO expects most of those jobs to change, not vanish.

A modest official forecast. The Office for Budget Responsibility expects UK productivity to grow 1% a year and unemployment to fall back to about 4% by 2030. It has also modelled a version in which technology pushes structural unemployment up to 5.5%. Even its downside scenario for the economy peaks at 6.8% in 2026-27.

03

The open question

Is the bottom rung of the career ladder gone for good?

The case that it is. Payroll data analysed at Stanford shows employment of 22 to 25 year olds in the jobs most exposed to AI running about 19% below where it would otherwise be, as of June 2026. A year earlier the gap was 15%. The pattern looks like less hiring, not more sacking, and the effect is concentrated where AI does the task outright. Experienced workers in the same jobs show no comparable gap. In the UK there are now 140 applications for every graduate vacancy, up from 86 two years earlier (Institute of Student Employers).

The case that it is a dip. The Stanford authors say their pattern is descriptive, and some of it predates ChatGPT. The Yale Budget Lab finds no clear link between AI exposure and unemployment. Danish administrative data rule out effects on pay or hours bigger than 2%, two years in (Humlum and Vestergaard).

Why it matters: junior jobs are where judgement gets built. An organisation that stops hiring 23-year-olds in 2026 discovers in 2034 that it has no 31-year-olds who know how anything works. That is a slow spending-down of cognitive capital, and it will not show up in this year's accounts.

04

What breaks

The productivity promise. In a randomised trial, experienced developers using AI took 19% longer while believing they were 20% faster (METR). A follow-up could not establish a speed-up either. Nobody should trust a self-reported AI saving, including their own.

Work gets heavier, not lighter. Researchers at Berkeley found AI did not reduce workloads; people worked faster, wider and longer (Harvard Business Review). In a survey by Upwork, a freelance platform, 88% of the most productive AI users reported burnout (Upwork). And 41% of workers say they have received what researchers call "workslop": polished-looking AI output that takes nearly two hours to fix.

Sickness. 2.78 million people in the UK are out of the workforce through long-term illness (ONS). The government warns that a further 600,000 could leave the workforce by 2030 if current trends continue (UK Parliament).

The young. Nearly a million 16 to 24 year olds, 13%, are not in education, employment or training (ONS).

Migration as a fix. UK net migration was 171,000 in 2025, down 82% from its peak (ONS). Japan, facing a projected shortfall of 3.84 million workers by 2035 (Persol and Chuo University, via Nippon.com), now has a record 2.57 million foreign workers (Japan labour ministry, via Nippon.com). Rich countries are about to compete for the same people.

A class divide in flexibility. Hybrid working reaches 45% of people earning over £50,000 and 8% of those under £20,000 (ONS).

05

Seen in the wild

  • Klarna announced that AI had replaced much of its customer service, then said the cuts had gone too far and began rehiring people.
  • South Cambridgeshire District Council made its four-day week permanent in July 2025.
  • Singapore gives over-40s a S$4,000 training credit and an allowance of up to S$3,000 a month while they retrain.
  • A basic income trial in the US paid 1,000 people $1,000 a month for three years. They worked one to two hours less a week. In Kenyan villages, a similar scheme moved people into running their own businesses, with little change in earnings from wage or farm work (J-PAL).
06

What to do

If you lead an organisation

  • Keep hiring juniors, and redesign the first rung so they learn judgement beside the machine instead of doing the tasks it now does.
  • Measure AI gains with your own controlled comparisons. Feelings of speed are not data.
  • Treat health and older workers as your labour supply. The OECD finds they offset more of the ageing squeeze than migration does.

If you are simply trying to stay employed

  • Build the skills that are hard to write down: judgement, persuasion, knowing how your particular organisation really works.
  • Plan on a longer working life, with at least one serious retraining in the middle of it.
  • Use the new rights as they arrive.
07

Our call

Server cabinets threaded with fibre cables

02 · Machines

Will AI eat the power grid?

Yes.

Our confidence 70%Synthetic panel median 76%

Photograph: Unsplash

Read the chapter

02 · Machines

Machines

The machines are improving faster than almost anyone predicted and being put to use more slowly than almost anyone admits. Both things are true, and the distance between them is the story of the decade.

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The City of London skyline at night across the Thames

03 · Money

Will we need a universal basic income?

No. A bigger benefits bill instead.

Our confidence 70%Synthetic panel median 64%

Photograph: Unsplash

Read the chapter

03 · Money

Money

Money is getting faster, more digital and easier to steal. Underneath that, something slower and larger is happening: ageing countries have made promises they have not worked out how to pay for.

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An NHS ambulance at speed on a British street

04 · Health

What happens to the NHS?

It survives, but misses its own promise.

Our confidence 55%Panel, on the earlier, easier line 87%

Photograph: Unsplash

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04 · Health

Health

Medicine is about to have one of the best decades in its history. Whether that makes the country healthier is a different question, and the answer depends less on the laboratory than on the postcode.

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An offshore wind farm under a heavy sky, in black and white

05 · Energy and climate

Will renewables win?

Only just.

Our confidence 60 to 65%Synthetic panel median 54%

Photograph: Unsplash

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05 · Energy and climate

Energy and climate

Two things are now true at once. Clean energy is winning faster than its critics said it could. And the world will pass 1.5 degrees of warming anyway. The 2030s are about living with both.

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Shoppers silhouetted against a lit shop window

06 · Buying

Will we stop buying so much stuff?

We already have, per head.

Our confidence 65%Synthetic panel median 70%

Photograph: Unsplash

Read the chapter

06 · Buying

Buying

Shopping has been declared dead, reborn and revolutionised so many times that it is worth starting with a dull fact. In Britain, roughly £73 of every £100 spent in retail is still spent in a shop (ONS).

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A container port lit up at night

07 · Making and moving

Will Britain make more of what it buys?

No.

Our confidence 75%Synthetic panel median 84%

Photograph: Unsplash

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07 · Making and moving

Making and moving

The West spent a decade promising to bring its factories home. China spent the same decade building them. This chapter is about what follows from that, and about how we will get around while it plays out.

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Tower cranes standing in a golden fog

08 · Places

Will we build the homes we need?

No.

Our confidence 70%Synthetic panel median 84%

Photograph: Unsplash

Read the chapter

08 · Places

Places

Buildings are the slowest technology we have. Most of the homes, streets and offices of 2035 are standing today, which makes this the easiest chapter to predict and the hardest in which to change anything.

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A combine harvester working through dust at dusk

09 · Food

Will British farming survive?

Yes. Fewer farms, same share of food.

Our confidence 65%Synthetic panel median 47%

Photograph: Unsplash

Read the chapter

09 · Food

Food

The future of food was supposed to arrive in a laboratory dish. So far it has arrived as a weather forecast, a weight-loss injection and a slightly more expensive bar of chocolate.

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Oxford's Radcliffe Camera and colleges, from above

10 · Learning

Is university still worth it?

For most, yes. Not for all.

Our confidence 70%Synthetic panel median 55%

Photograph: Unsplash

Read the chapter

10 · Learning

Learning

Education is being hit by two things at once: a machine that can do the homework, and a shortage of children to set it for. The second gets far less attention and is far more certain.

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Newspapers running through a printing press

11 · Truth

Will we get our news from AI?

Yes, nearly a third of us.

Our confidence 60%Synthetic panel median 34%

Photograph: Unsplash

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11 · Truth

Truth

The fear was that we would drown in convincing lies. What is happening is quieter and in some ways stranger: the people who check facts for a living are losing their income, and a growing share of us ask a machine instead.

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Light trails past Big Ben and Westminster at night

12 · Power

Is Britain shrinking?

Yes, without migration.

Our confidence 65%Synthetic panel median 57%

Photograph: Unsplash

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12 · Power

Power

Power in 2035 will be shaped by two forces that move at very different speeds. Demography is slow and almost certain. Geopolitics is fast and almost unknowable. This chapter leans on the first and is careful about the second.

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Motorway junctions branching apart at night, from above

Part three · Worlds in 2035

What could 2035 feel like?

Four worlds, one household, nine years.

Photograph: Unsplash

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Part three

Worlds in 2035

The twelve open questions in part two are not independent. They tend to resolve together, because the same two things sit under most of them.

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Part four · The calls

How will we know if we were right?

Twelve calls, marked in public every October.

Photograph: Unsplash

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Part four

The calls

Here are the twelve questions people ask us most about the next decade, our answer to each, and the call that tests it. Every call names the body whose published figure will settle it, so that nobody, least of all us, gets to mark it generously.

QuestionOur answerThe call for 2035ConfidenceSettled by
Will AI take our jobs?No. Not enough to break the jobs market.UK unemployment is below 5.5% in February to April 203560%ONS labour market statistics
Will AI eat the power grid?Yes.The world's data centres use more than 1,000 TWh of electricity in 203570%International Energy Agency
Will we need a universal basic income?No. We will pay for a bigger benefits bill instead.The UK pays no universal basic income, and working-age benefit spending is above 4% of GDP in 2034-3570%DWP benefit expenditure tables
What happens to the NHS?It survives, but misses its own promise.Fewer than 75% of patients waiting for planned treatment in England have waited under 18 weeks in March 203555%NHS England referral-to-treatment statistics
Will renewables win?Only just.Renewables generate at least half the world's electricity60 to 65%Ember Global Electricity Review
Will we stop buying so much stuff?We already have, per head.Retail sales volume per person in Great Britain is still below its 2021 peak65%ONS retail sales and population estimates
Will Britain make more of what it buys?No.The UK's deficit on trade in goods is at least 6% of GDP75%ONS balance of payments
Will we build the homes we need?No.The seven new towns proposed in 2026 have completed fewer than 30,000 homes70%Official housing completions
Will British farming survive?Yes. Fewer farms, same share of food.The UK still produces at least 60% of the food it eats, by value65%Defra, Agriculture in the United Kingdom
Is university still worth it?For most, yes. Not for all.At least 35% of UK 18-year-olds go to university70%UCAS end-of-cycle data
Will we get our news from AI?Yes, nearly a third of us.At least 30% use AI assistants for news weekly, and trust in news is between 30% and 40%60%Reuters Institute Digital News Report
Is Britain shrinking?Yes, without migration.The UK records more deaths than births in each year to mid-2027 through mid-2035, and its population is under 72 million at mid-203565%ONS mid-year estimates
01

How to read our confidence

If these numbers mean anything, we should get about eight of the twelve right. If we get all twelve, we were too timid and should have said things that were harder to know. If we get five, we were overconfident and you should discount us accordingly. Being wrong on some of these is what honest confidence levels look like.

02

A second opinion

The odds in this section are synthetic: they come from language models asked to forecast, not from people, and they are published whole, including the ones that embarrass us. How the panel was built, and what it cannot do, is on the method page.

Before publishing we put the twelve calls to a panel of 24 synthetic forecasters: twelve analytical lenses (a labour economist, a demographer, an energy systems analyst, a public finance specialist, an infrastructure delivery specialist, a political scientist, an actuary and others), each run on two different models, each working alone, each told exactly how a call would be marked but not how confident we were, and each allowed to look up the latest official figures before answering. Ensembles of language models have matched human forecasting crowds in published tests, which makes this the one use of synthetic voices with evidence behind it. The panel's job is to tell us where we may be fooling ourselves, not to replace our judgement.

QuestionOur confidencePanel medianMiddle half of the panel
Will AI take our jobs?60%78%*69 to 85*
Will AI eat the power grid?70%76%74 to 82
Will we need a universal basic income?70%64%63 to 70
What happens to the NHS?55%87%*84 to 91*
Will renewables win?60 to 65%54%48 to 60
Will we stop buying so much stuff?65%70%66 to 78
Will Britain make more of what it buys?75%84%81 to 88
Will we build the homes we need?70%84%70 to 92
Will British farming survive?65%47%47 to 52
Is university still worth it?70%55%50 to 57
Will we get our news from AI?60%34%31 to 38
Is Britain shrinking?65%57%53 to 76

* The panel judged the earlier, easier versions of these two calls (unemployment below 6%; fewer than 92% seen within 18 weeks). We made both harder after reading its view, so its figures for them are not comparable with ours.

The splits run both ways. On news from AI, farming and university the panel thinks we are too sure; on the NHS, trade and the new towns it thinks we are not sure enough.

Six of the calls were put to the panel twice. The first round, on 11 October, let each forecaster search for the latest figures, and it showed that retrieval mattered more than reasoning: the forecasters who missed a twelve-day-old announcement on the state pension sat 22 points below those who found it. So when we replaced six calls with plainer questions (on a basic income, the NHS, consumption, trade, farming and university), the second round gave every forecaster the same dated evidence pack and no search. Disagreements in that round are about judgement, not news.

Taken together, the panel expected about 7.9 of the twelve calls to come right; our own numbers imply 7.9 now, and 8.1 before the two changes described below. It is surer than we are of the calls where a long trend has to break for us to be wrong: the NHS missing 18 weeks, the trade deficit, the new towns, unemployment. It is less sure of the calls that turn on behaviour or a knife-edge threshold: news from AI most of all, then farming, university, renewables and the population. Its doubt on news is specific: it expects weekly use of AI for news to plateau in the twenties, as podcasts did, and its own test is the 2027 Digital News Report, where 14% or more keeps the call alive and 11% or less means it is stalling. We will apply that test in our first scorecard.

Where the panel gives us pause: farming and university. On farming it puts the call at 47%, a coin toss, because the UK's food self-sufficiency already sits close to our 60% line and has drifted down for decades. On university it puts us at 55%, because the entry rate for 18-year-olds slipped in 2025 and again on early 2026 figures and the panel weighs the falling graduate premium and the strain on university finances more heavily than we do. We have held both, and say so: if the 2027 figures move against us we will lower our confidence in public.

Where we listened: the NHS and jobs. The panel put our original NHS call, that the 92% standard would still be missed, at 87%. That told us the call was too easy, not that we were too cautious, so we made it harder: the call is now that fewer than 75% will have been seen within 18 weeks in March 2035, which bets that the recovery stalls well short of the promise rather than merely missing it. On jobs the panel put us at 78%, so we moved the line from 6% to 5.5%, below the level in the Office for Budget Responsibility's own scenario where technology pushes structural unemployment up. Our confidence in each is lower as a result, 55% and 60%. If the report's rule is that getting all twelve right means we were too timid, these are the two places we have tried to be less so.

The panel also found a marking hazard in every one of the twelve calls, from the ONS's switch to a new labour force survey to the absence of any official count of homes completed in new towns. The marking rules we will hold ourselves to are on the method page, because a call that cannot be marked is not a call.

03

What the calls have in common

Read down the answers and a view of the decade appears. Most of them say that something people fear or hope for does not arrive on time: AI does not empty the job market, the homes are not built, the NHS does not get back to 18 weeks, Britain does not make more of what it buys, the basic income does not come. Several say that a slow trend keeps going: more deaths than births, less stuff bought per head, a farming sector that shrinks without losing its share of the plate. Only a few say that something moves fast: the machines' appetite for electricity, the share of it that comes from renewables, and the number of people who get their news from a machine.

That is the argument of this report in twelve lines. Intelligence is getting cheap fast. Almost everything it needs in order to matter (people, proof, physical capacity and the ability to join them up) is scarce and slow.

04

The call we did not make

We have not predicted the outcome of any war or election, and we have not put a date on any breakthrough in artificial intelligence. Those are the things people most want forecast and the things least possible to forecast. We would sooner say so.

05

The scorecard

Every October The Future Collective will publish where each call stands: on track, off track or settled. Where the evidence has moved, we will say how our confidence has changed and why. If we abandon a call we will say that too, and leave the original on the page.

06

The questions underneath

A forecast tells you what to expect. A question tells you what to do. These are the twelve we would put to any leadership team, and to ourselves.

  1. Where will your next generation of experienced people come from, if you are not hiring beginners now?
  2. What can your organisation do with AI today that it could not do last year, and how do you know?
  3. Which promises have you made that depend on money you have not yet found?
  4. Who among your people cannot get the care the others can?
  5. What do you need from the grid, the water company and the planning office, and have you asked?
  6. If a machine chose for your customer, would it choose you?
  7. Which single country, supplier or route could stop you for six weeks?
  8. Where will your people live?
  9. What have you assumed will stay cheap?
  10. Are your people becoming more capable, or only more productive?
  11. How would a stranger check that what you say is true?
  12. What have you assumed the state will keep doing for you?

Method

How we tested our own tools

We will build a synthetic population of UK adults and use it in three ways: to test it against today's Britain, to live out the four worlds to 2035, and to put independent odds on the twelve calls. Every synthetic number will be labelled as synthetic, and none will be presented as a measurement of real people.

01

What it is

Three layers, each with a different job.

  1. A synthetic population. About 2,000 households (48 archetypes in the pilot) built to match ONS totals for age, region, income, tenure, work status, household type and health. This is the standard technique behind transport and tax microsimulation. No AI is involved in building it.
  2. A persona layer. A language model gives each household a voice and answers structured questions as that person, many times over, each run independent of the others.
  3. An analysis layer. Answers are weighted back to the population and reported as distributions with ranges, never as single point estimates.
02

What we will and will not claim

We will sayWe will not say
"In our simulation, households like X tend to do Y under world Z""N% of Britons will do Y by 2035"
"The synthetic population reproduces today's figure for X to within N points""Our model predicts"
"Real people in our interviews told us" (kept separate, always)Any synthetic figure without its label
03

Three uses, in order

  1. Calibration, now. Ask the personas about today, where the answers are known: hybrid working, private healthcare, loneliness, trust in government, news habits, food insecurity, heat pumps, smoking. Publish the gaps, including the embarrassing ones. If the population cannot reproduce 2026, it has no business describing 2035.
  2. Living the four worlds. Put every household through The Long Grind, The Crossing, The Split and The Shock. The structural numbers (pensions, rents, energy prices, employment) are fixed from the chapters; the personas are asked only what the household does and how it feels. This turns Sam in Stockport into two thousand Sams, and part three from fiction into something a reader can interrogate.
  3. Odds on the calls. A panel of diverse synthetic forecasters puts a probability on each of the twelve calls, with reasons. Where they disagree with our confidence levels, we look again. Ensembles of language models have matched human forecasting crowds in published tests, so this is the one use with direct evidence behind it. Run on 11 October 2026; results in part four and at the foot of this page.
04

Rules

  • Calibration results are published whole, misses included.
  • Model, prompt and population version are recorded for every run, so any number can be rerun.
  • A synthetic number never stands alone; the nearest real figure sits beside it.
  • Real interviews ground a subset of agents.
05

The pilot

Forty-eight archetypes span age (four bands), region (London; the South; the Midlands and North; Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) and household income (three bands), with tenure, work status, household type, health, ethnicity and 2024 vote assigned to match published totals. Each archetype was run twice on Claude Sonnet and once on Claude Fable 5.1, 144 synthetic responses in all. Each run invents a specific person within the archetype's fixed attributes, describes an ordinary Tuesday in their voice, and then answers the battery below as that person would answer a market researcher in October 2026. Option order and question order are shuffled per run, each run is a fresh context, and the personas are not steered towards the right answer; the point is to measure the raw bias.

Calibration battery

QuestionReal figureSource
Works a hybrid pattern (among workers)28% of workers in Great Britain; 45% of those earning £50,000 or more, 8% of those under £20,000; 41% of degree holders; 19% of workers aged 16 to 29, 36% of 30 to 49s, 24% of 50 to 69sONS, June 2025
Paid for private healthcare in the last year16% of adults in EnglandHealthwatch England, via trade press
Holds at least three-quarters of savings in cash (of those with over £10,000)61%FCA Financial Lives 2024
Took regulated financial advice in the last year8.6% of adultsFCA Financial Lives 2024
Often or always lonely6.6% of adults in England; 9% of 16 to 24sCommunity Life Survey 2024/25
Trusts the UK government (6 or more on a 0 to 10 scale)27%; the courts and legal system 62%ONS, fieldwork October 2023 (the OECD's 2025 wave was published in June 2026; UK figure to be added)
Household ran short of food in the last month12.2% of households; 16.7% of those with childrenFood Foundation, June 2026
Pays for online news10% in the UKReuters Institute, 2026, UK page
Uses an AI chatbot for news weekly4% in the UK, the lowest of 48 markets and flat on the year; 10% across all markets; 16% of under-35sReuters Institute, 2026, AI chapter
Trusts most news most of the time30% in the UK, down five points in a yearReuters Institute, 2026, UK page
Uses generative AI for any purpose61% have ever used one and 34% use one weekly (six-country average including the UK, mid-2025); 40% of the UK public had used an LLM by late 2024Reuters Institute, Generative AI and News 2025; Alan Turing Institute and Ada Lovelace Institute, 2025
Home has a heat pumpUnder 2% of UK homesClimate Change Committee, 2026
Smokes cigarettes9.8% of UK adults; 7.2% of 18 to 24s, 12.4% of 45 to 54s, 7.2% of over-65sONS, Adult smoking habits in the UK: 2025
Vapes daily or occasionally9.9% of adults in Great BritainONS, 2025
Expects children today to be better off than their parents19% better off, 79% worse offPew Research Center, spring 2024
Expects own finances to worsen in the next year; uses social media for news weeklyAsked for information; no anchor used in the pilotONS and Reuters track both

Two further checks test the population weights rather than the personas: work status against the ONS labour market figures (employment 75.1%, unemployment 4.9%, inactivity 20.9%), and tenure against the English Housing Survey.

06

Known weaknesses of the method

The research on synthetic respondents is young, mostly American, and largely sceptical. The main findings, each of which shaped the pilot design and each of which the pilot then reproduced.

Right averages, wrong distributions. Bisbee and colleagues (Political Analysis, 2024) had ChatGPT answer American National Election Study questions as thousands of described respondents. The averages matched the real survey closely; the variation was smaller than in real responses, regression coefficients often differed significantly, the distributions moved with minor changes of prompt wording, and the same prompt gave different results three months apart.

A bias of the model's own. Boelaert and colleagues (Sociological Methods and Research, 2025) call it machine bias: on each topic a model shows a strong bias and low variance, and the bias changes unpredictably from one topic to the next. Their conclusion is that current models cannot yet replace research subjects in opinion or attitude research.

Caricature. Wang, Morgenstern and Dickerson (Nature Machine Intelligence, 2025) show that models asked to speak as a group produce portrayals closer to how outsiders stereotype that group than to how its members describe themselves, and flatten the variety inside the group.

Survey mechanics. Dominguez-Olmedo, Hardt and Mendler-Dünner (NeurIPS 2024) found a strong preference for whichever option is listed first and, once that is corrected, answers that resemble no real demographic group. Synthetic respondents almost never say they don't know.

The largest independent test, published on 30 September 2026. Pew Research Center (30 September 2026) built digital twins of about 6,700 members of its American Trends Panel and re-ran three 2026 surveys, nearly 300 questions, through Claude Opus 4.6 and GPT-5.1. The synthetic results differed from the real ones by an average of 12 percentage points (11.4 for Opus, 13.3 for GPT), by more than 15 points on 28% of questions, and by most for Republicans (16.1 points) and Black adults (15.1). Nearly half the questions had at least one answer option that no synthetic respondent chose. The twins knew far more than real people (98% could name a First Amendment right, against 52% of humans) and said "not sure" a quarter as often. The two models erred in opposite directions: GPT made Americans more extreme than they are, Opus more middle-of-the-road. Pew's verdict: not an adequate replacement for polling.

The professional standard. The AAPOR task force on AI in survey research (2026) calls synthetic responses the riskiest use of AI in the field, says there is no consensus on when, if ever, they can stand in for human ones, and draws the acceptable boundary at clearly labelled pretesting, pilot work and exploratory diagnostics. It prefers the term synthetic responses to synthetic samples, because the method is not a sampling design, and says the next tests should ask whether correlations, joint distributions and subgroup interactions are preserved, not only the marginal totals.

Where the evidence is better. Two findings cut the other way, and both are built into the plan. Park and colleagues (Stanford, 2024) built agents for 1,052 real people from two-hour interviews; those agents reproduced each person's own General Social Survey answers at 83 to 86% of the person's own two-week test-retest consistency, against 74% for agents built from demographics alone, with smaller accuracy gaps across racial and ideological groups. And Schoenegger and colleagues (Science Advances, 2024) found that an ensemble of twelve language models matched a human forecasting crowd on a set of real-world questions, which is the evidence behind using a synthetic panel to put odds on the twelve calls.

What this meant for the pilot. Option order and question order shuffled per run; one respondent per fresh context; a specific invented person rather than a demographic label; 2024 vote included in every persona, because politics predicts attitudes; raw, unsteered answers so the bias can be measured; subgroup and within-archetype checks, not just totals; and every figure labelled synthetic. One weakness no design choice can fix: an answer that no synthetic respondent ever gives cannot be reweighted into existence afterwards.

07

Pilot results

All figures in this section are synthetic responses, weighted to the UK adult population by archetype. They are not measurements of real people. The real figure sits beside each one.

The run. 11 October 2026. Every response kept the attributes it was given: 144 of 144 matched the assigned work status and the presence of children, so the population layer does its job of holding the structure fixed. The archetype weights reproduce the ONS shares for age, region, income, tenure and work status to within a point. Ranges in brackets are 90% intervals from resampling the 48 archetypes, which is the honest size of the pilot's uncertainty.

MeasureRealSonnet (96 responses)Fable (48 responses)
Hybrid working, among workers28%32% (17 to 48)32% (17 to 50)
Hybrid, workers earning £50k or more45%90% (79 to 100)81% (57 to 100)
Hybrid, workers earning under £20k8%0%0%
Hybrid, workers with a degree41%71% (50 to 92)71% (50 to 92)
Hybrid, workers aged 18 to 34 / 35 to 54 / 55 to 7419% / 36% / 24% (ONS bands differ)29% / 38% / 25%29% / 39% / 25%
Works from home only, among workersa stable minority0%0%
Paid for private healthcare, last 12 months16% (England)3% (1 to 6)25% (15 to 35)
Holds three-quarters or more of savings in cash, of those with over £10k61%65% (48 to 82)59% (42 to 75)
Took regulated financial advice, last 12 months8.6%0%14% (6 to 21)
Lonely often or always6.6%; 9% of young adults0%0%
Trusts the UK government, 6 or more out of 1027%0%0%
Trusts the courts, 6 or more out of 1062%34% (24 to 45)61% (50 to 73)
Household food insecure in the last month12.2%; 16.7% with children21% (11 to 30); 24% with children17% (8 to 27); 26% with children
Pays for online news10%6% (2 to 11)18% (8 to 27)
Used an AI chatbot for news last week4% (UK)0%0%
Used social media for news last weeknot anchored75% (66 to 84)80% (71 to 90)
Trusts most news most of the time30%10% (4 to 16)38% (27 to 50)
Currently uses AI tools for any purpose34 to 61%59% (48 to 70)50% (40 to 62)
Uses AI tools, aged 18 to 34 / 55 to 74 / 75 and oversteep gradient, not vertical100% / 20% / 0%100% / 13% / 0%
Home heated by a heat pumpunder 2%0%0%
Smokes cigarettes9.8%5% (2 to 8)4% (0 to 10)
Smokes, aged 18 to 347% and up0%0%
Vapes9.9%12% (5 to 20)21% (12 to 31)
Expects children today to be better off / worse off19% / 79%0% / 100%0% / 100%
Expects own finances to get worse / better in the next yearnot anchored62% / 0%39% / 3%

The headline averages come out close because the errors cancel: whole groups vanish at one end while the comfortable majority is overdrawn at the other.

Mean absolute error against the 27 anchors: Sonnet 11.6 points, Fable 9.6 points. Pew's independent test of the best available model on 300 American questions came out at 11.4. We are where the state of the art is, and the state of the art is not good enough to publish as measurement.

What the pilot shows

  1. The averages that look right are often right for the wrong reason. Hybrid working comes out at 32% against a real 28%, but underneath, 81 to 90% of workers on £50,000 or more are hybrid (real: 45%) and none under £20,000 (real: 8%); 71% of graduates (real: 41%) and no non-graduates at all. Nobody works only from home. The personas treat hybrid working as a class badge, where real life hands it out unevenly across the whole range.
  2. Missing minorities. Across 144 synthetic responses, not one felt lonely often or always (real: one adult in fifteen, one young adult in eleven); not one gave the government six or more out of ten (real: more than a quarter; the synthetic scores bunch at two, three and four); not one expected children today to be better off than their parents (real: nearly one in five; all 144 said worse off); not one had used an AI chatbot for news that week (real: 4%, a small miss); not one under 35 smoked; and only two of 144 expected their own finances to improve. Pew found the same thing: nearly half its questions had an option no synthetic respondent ever chose. These are the people a futures report most needs to see, the ones who do not fit their demographic, and the method erases them.
  3. Everything sorts by income. Fable gave private healthcare to 13 of its 16 higher-income personas and one of the other 32; Sonnet gave it to two of 96. In reality 16% of adults in England used it last year, spread across the income range. Every food-insecure household in both models sits in the lower-income third (17 of Sonnet's 32 lower-income responses, none of the other 64); all six smokers are lower-income and none is under 35. Income predicts these things in the real data; it does not determine them.
  4. The model is a variable, and the two models lean opposite ways. Sonnet's Britain is poorer and gloomier: 21% food insecure, 62% expecting their finances to worsen, 10% trusting the news (real 30%), 34% trusting the courts (real 62%), almost nobody paying privately for health or advice. Fable's Britain is more comfortable and more trusting: 25% private healthcare, 18% paying for news (real 10%), 21% vaping (real 10%), 14% taking financial advice (real 8.6%), but close to the real figure on the courts, cash holdings, AI use and trust in news. Fable was closer on nine anchors, Sonnet on six, with twelve ties (mostly shared zeros). Pew saw the same split between GPT-5.1 (too extreme) and Opus 4.6 (too moderate). Any full build has to run more than one model and publish the spread.
  5. Inside an archetype the model barely varies. Sonnet's two independent runs of the same archetype gave the same answer to the same question 96% of the time at the median (75% at worst), and their 0-to-10 trust scores differed by 0.2 points on average. Real people who share a demographic cell disagree far more than that. Twenty-one of the 48 archetypes produced the same first name in two of the three runs, and seven of the 144 people are called Colin. Extra runs of the same archetype buy almost nothing; what is missing is variety within the cell.
  6. Direction is usually right; level is not. The age gradient in AI use runs the right way (but at 100% of under-35s and 0% of over-75s it is a cliff, not a slope). Hybrid working by age lands within a few points of the ONS bands. Households with children are more food insecure than those without. Cash holding among savers (59 to 65% against 61%), overall AI use, and Fable's trust in the courts are close. Smoking is undercounted by half in both models.

Our call on the method

As a measuring instrument, the raw method fails the calibration test, in exactly the ways the literature predicted: plausible totals, caricatured subgroups, missing minorities, and a tilt that depends on which model you ask. We will say so in the report, in full, and we will not publish a synthetic level as if it described Britain.

It is not useless, and the pilot says how to use it.

  • Living the four worlds (use two) survives as a comparative tool. The same household run through The Long Grind and The Shock gives a defensible answer to "what changes", even where its absolute level is wrong, because the bias is largely shared across worlds. Report differences between worlds, never levels, always labelled, always beside a real figure.
  • Odds on the calls (use three) is unaffected. It rests on different evidence (ensemble forecasting) and does not depend on persona fidelity.
  • For the full build, in order of value: build the 2,000 households by iterative proportional fitting rather than running more repeats of 48; seed the within-cell traits the pilot lost (loneliness, trust, optimism, smoking, private spending) from their known marginals so the minorities exist, then test on held-out questions, since the seeded ones are right by construction; ground a subset of agents in the real interviews (the Stanford work took demographics-only agents from 74% to 83 to 86% of a human benchmark); run Fable as the primary model and Sonnet as the check, and publish both; break the default persona with a seeded name and detail step; and record the exact model version string on every run, which this pilot did not.
  • Budget. Two thousand households, four worlds and three question rounds is about 24,000 runs. At this pilot's prompt that is over two billion tokens; a production prompt without the tool context and with batched questions is roughly a tenth of that.

The pilot's own numbers, scripts, archetype definitions and all 144 synthetic responses are available from The Future Collective on request so any figure here can be rerun.

08

The forecasting panel

Synthetic. Twenty-four forecasts per call from language models, not people.

Design. Twelve analytical lenses (a base-rate generalist, a labour economist, an energy systems analyst, a public finance and pensions specialist, a demographer, a health inequalities epidemiologist, an infrastructure delivery specialist, a retail and consumer analyst, a media researcher, a historian of technology adoption, a political scientist and an actuary), each run once on Claude Fable 5.1 and once on Claude Sonnet, each run covering six of the twelve calls in shuffled order: 48 runs, 24 independent forecasts per call. Every forecaster was given the call, the settling body and the exact marking rule, and was not told our confidence. Each could use up to two web searches per call to find the current value of the indicator, and had to write down its reading of the rule, the current state, an outside view, the strongest case each way, the likeliest failure path, a probability from 1 to 99, its confidence in its own number and the one 2027 figure that would change its mind. Compound calls were estimated part by part.

CallOur confidencePanel medianMiddle halfFull rangeFable / Sonnet medians
Work65%78%69 to 8568 to 8769 / 85
Machines70%76%74 to 8259 to 8673 / 82
Money75% (was 60%)44%42 to 4933 to 7348 / 42
Health75%82%78 to 8662 to 9182 / 82
Energy and climate60 to 65%54%48 to 6046 to 8158 / 52
Buying65%63%57 to 7141 to 8056 / 72
Making and moving85%94%93 to 9789 to 9893 / 97
Places70%84%70 to 9261 to 9569 / 92
Food75%72%69 to 7961 to 8680 / 70
Learning75%93%92 to 9586 to 9792 / 95
Truth60%34%31 to 3824 to 4434 / 32
Power65%57%53 to 7614 to 8854 / 77

What the panel taught us about the panel.

  • Retrieval decides more than reasoning. The two lowest numbers in the whole exercise, 14% on Power and 33% on Money, came from forecasters working without the latest figures, one reasoning carefully from memory of projections two years out of date, the other from a July report. Nineteen of the 24 forecasters missed a decisive announcement on the triple lock that was twelve days old; the five who found it sat 22 points above the rest. Any future run needs a shared, dated evidence pack per call before the forecasters start, so that disagreement is about judgement rather than news.
  • The model tilts. Sonnet sat on average 3 points above the call medians and Fable 2 points below; Sonnet was markedly more confident in our calls on Places (92 against 69), Power (77 against 54), Work (85 against 69) and Buying (72 against 56). Two models are the minimum; three would be better.
  • The lens does not. No lens sat more than 2.5 points from the medians on average, so the analytical persona did not drive the answer. Diversity of evidence mattered more than diversity of character.
  • The panel knows what it does not know. It called itself low-confidence on the two political and behavioural calls (Money, 20 of 24 forecasters; Truth, 23 of 24) and high-confidence on the two structural ones (HS2, 22 of 24; pupils, 21 of 24), and its spread followed suit.
  • Compound calls are the hard ones. Food, Truth and Power each join two conditions with an "and". The panel priced the parts separately and the joint came out well below either part (Truth: 50% for the adoption leg, 71% for the trust leg, 34% joint). Our own confidence levels had not fully priced the "and".

Marking rules. The panel found a hazard in every call. These are the rules we will mark ourselves by.

  1. Work. The ONS headline rate for people aged 16 and over, for February to April 2035, on whichever survey is the headline in June 2035, is below 5.5%. If the ONS has moved to a new survey and published a back-series, the new basis applies throughout.
  2. Machines. The IEA's latest published central estimate for 2035 standing at the time of marking, on the IEA's own definition of data centres (crypto mining excluded if the IEA excludes it).
  3. Energy and climate. The latest Ember edition standing in October 2036 for calendar 2035, renewables excluding nuclear, after Ember's revisions.
  4. Places. Completions inside the boundaries of the seven sites in the March 2026 draft programme, or the final list that replaces it, from each site's designation date, with the two extension sites' pre-designation pipelines excluded. If no official attributable series exists we will assemble the count from local authority monitoring and publish the working.
  5. Truth. The Reuters Institute's all-market averages as published, on whatever set of markets it surveys that year. If the AI question is reworded, the nearest equivalent, with a note.
  6. Power. The ONS vintage standing in October 2036 for the mid-2035 estimate, after any census rebasing. A year that is revised from natural increase to natural decrease, or the reverse, counts as revised.

The panel's 48 runs, the assignments each forecaster received and the aggregation script are available from The Future Collective on request.

09

The second round: six new calls

Synthetic. Twenty-four forecasts per call from language models, not people.

On the evening of 11 October we replaced six calls with plainer questions: a basic income (Money), the NHS (Health), consumption (Buying), trade (Making and moving), farming (Food) and university (Learning). The same 24 forecasters, twelve lenses on two models, judged the new calls, but this time with no web search: each was given the same dated evidence pack of 11 or 12 sourced facts per call, so that disagreement would be about judgement rather than news.

QuestionOur confidencePanel medianMiddle halfFable / Sonnet medians
Will we need a universal basic income?70%64%63 to 7062 / 70
What happens to the NHS?70%87%84 to 9184 / 91
Will we stop buying so much stuff?65%70%66 to 7867 / 79
Will Britain make more of what it buys?75%84%81 to 8880 / 88
Will British farming survive?65%47%47 to 5247 / 50
Is university still worth it?70%55%50 to 5757 / 50

After this run we made two calls harder: unemployment below 5.5% (was 6%) and fewer than 75% of NHS patients seen within 18 weeks (was 92%). The tables above record the confidence and panel figures for the earlier versions.

With a shared evidence pack the spread narrowed sharply: no call's middle half was wider than 13 points, against 24 in the first round. Sonnet again sat above Fable, on five of the six; university was the exception.

Marking rules for the new calls

  1. Money. Both must hold: no UK-wide unconditional cash payment to all adults is in payment on 31 December 2035 (pilots and local schemes do not count); and the first DWP benefit expenditure tables to report an outturn for 2034-35 show working-age benefit spending in Great Britain strictly above 4.00% of GDP.
  2. Health. NHS England's England-level share of incomplete referral-to-treatment pathways within 18 weeks for March 2035, as first published and including estimates for missing trusts, is below 75.0%. If the measure is redefined, NHS England's official successor applies; if none exists the call is void.
  3. Buying. ONS annual retail sales volume (all retailing, J5EK) divided by the Great Britain mid-year population, for 2035 against 2021, both from the vintage current when 2035 data first appear. Right if 2035 is strictly below 2021.
  4. Making and moving. The ONS trade in goods balance (BOKI) for 2035 divided by nominal GDP (YBHA), on the first full-year estimate at the end of March 2036. Right if the deficit is 6.0% of GDP or more, rounded to one decimal place.
  5. Food. Defra's all-food UK production to supply ratio for 2035, as first published in Agriculture in the United Kingdom 2035, as the whole number Defra prints. Right at 60 or more; later revisions ignored.
  6. Learning. UCAS's end-of-cycle UK 18-year-old entry rate for the 2035 cycle, as first published. Right at 35.0% or more.

What Next is published by The Future Collective, October 2026. Figures link to their sources; where we could not verify a figure we cut it.

Synthetic material (the pilot population and the forecasting panel) is labelled wherever it appears and described in full under Method. It is never presented as a measurement of real people.

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